Lawyers representing Bright Field and its owner, Clearsky Shipping, a Liberian company setup a toll free number Monday December 16th for people who want to file claims for damages or injuries resulting from the accident.
or Fax (504) 524-2203
About 2:30 pm Saturday 14 December 1996 Liberian registered freightliner, Bright Field, rammed into a dock housing a Riverwalk mall and hotel complex in New Orleans LA. The 763 foot freightliner piloted by Ted Davisson was loaded with 56,000 tons of corn bound for Kashima Japan via the Panama Canal. The freightliner apparently lost an engine lube oil pump which automatically shut down an engine at a very bad time (3 minutes till impact). Manual over-rides (to the shutdown) were available but not used. Early in the investigation it was unclear if the crew knew of their existence and how to use them.
The Bright Field was going downriver and had just cleared the Crescent City Connection (bridge) and was unable to make the hard turn right after the bridge. Initially they were headed at the Creole Queen excursion boat, then later at the Flamingo casino boat and the Riverwalk.
As the large ship bore down on the shopping center, Davisson was able to drop the bow anchor and when it caught it jerked the bow around and cause the ship to 'parallel park' between two cruise ships (one was the Nieuw Amsterdam) and a casino boat named Hilton Flaming Casino with 800 people on board.. It was earlier reported there may have been a communication problem with the mostly Chinese crew but the captain seemed to think they understood his request to drop anchor, but just did not comply. When the Bright Field finally came to rest, it was about 70 feet from the Flamingo Casino. You can see the actual crash in a CNN Quick Time movie. Note the impact occurs broadside vs. the almost head on photo moments before due to the anchor hanging and yanking the bow around.
December 22 AP reported, "Testimony indicates the incident that injured at least 116 people and caused millions of dollars in damages could have been prevented if the engineer had known there was an emergency and would have hit an override button. That would have restored full power within 10 seconds. Engineer Fang Jim Yun testified that he did not know anything was wrong so he used a slower, traditional method of restoring power. The ship's captain says he had alerted the engineer, but admitted his warning might not have been heard due to the ship's horn."
Amazingly, no deaths were reported in the crash. A night time crash would have been much worse with the hotel full of sleeping people. On this particular Saturday afternoon, many of the hotel's guest were at the nearby Superdome watching a Louisiana High School Football Championship game.
In 1984 the World's Fair was held here and parts of the International Building are still a part of the mall. At that time there was an effort to put barges in the river for crowds to view the fair from. It was stopped due to the risks in this high traffic area. Most public facilities in the area are built on shore and do not overhang the water. The two exceptions are this Riverwalk area and the Algiers Landing Restaurant. A nice graphic in the multimedia section shows the edge of the river is actually marked by a sunken vertical concrete bulkhead and shows the location of this wall in respect to facilities at Riverwalk.
The Bright Field is a 763 foot, 9,789 HP, 68,200 dwt Liberian registered freightliner with a top speed of about 14 knots is listed as built 1/12/88. It is owned and operated by COSCO, a Hong Kong shipping firm. COSCO is the worlds 4th largest shipping firm by tonnage and dead weight, owning 78 vessels. Most of them are bulk carriers like the Bright Field. COSCO stands for "China Ocean Shipping Company". AP wrote a nice background information story on COSCO and they also have a web site at http://www.cosco.com.hk:80/shipping.htm. Their web site includes a nice specifications sheet on the Bright Field which we copied to this site.
On July 11, 1996 the Bright Field passed its annual Coast Guard inspection and it had also been given a clean bill of health by the union representing its crew.
The Bright Field lost about 15 foot off under the bow and was pushed up to the remainder of the dock by a number of tugs (see the AP Photo as rescue efforts and problem evaluations continued. Note- Check out the prop wash from the tugs in the photo. Later, GE (General Electric) took the opportunity to issue a Press Release that three of the tugs stabilizing the vessel and preventing additional collapse of the shopping area were powered by GE diesel electric engines.
The Friday night (December 13) preceding the Saturday afternoon crash an engine heat exchanger was removed upstream, brought to New Orleans for cleaning, and reinstalled on the bright Field. It is unknown if this had any relation to the events that followed.
Monday December 16 officials said, a strong cold front that brought wind and rain was making the tugboats' task more difficult.
The river is very busy here. Approximately 6000 large ocean bound vessels and 120,000 tugs pushing and pulling barges pass this point each year. At this time of year, large amounts of grain are being exported to Asia. A Reuters report discusses the problems that will result if the river is closed more than a few days. They have already evaluated moving the grain by rail to the west coast for bulk transport but currently have sufficient reserves to cover the anticipated few days delay on current shipments coming through the crash area which are due there in mid January.
On Dec 18 CNN reports Pilot Davisson saying the local river pilot was blowing the horn (warning horn?) at the time he (Davisson) was trying to tell the Chinese crew to drop anchor and they did not respond immediately because they could not hear him. Later Chinese Captain Jing Quan Deng testifies he heard and agreed with Davisson's ideas for full speed astern, rudder to hard right, and dropping the anchor. His "first man to anchor" could not hear him initially over the alarms. Then when he could be heard the man did not drop anchor for fear of swinging into a cruise ship, the Niew Amsterdam. Finally, when the "first man to anchor" saw they were bearing down on a casino boat he dropped the anchor.
A December 20th USA Today - AP report mentions a page is found missing in the engine log records covering the 2 days prior to the crash, Maritime law of limiting damages to the value of the ship and its cargo (about $16 million) if the ship is found to be seaworthy and the crew is void of negligence is being discussed, and a marine firm was caught removing the failed lube pump thought to have contributed to the disaster.
During the inquiry, the Coast Guard pointed out that power loss is common in this area. In the previous 24 hours (to the 2nd day of testimony) 3 freighters lost power and were anchored upriver of the city and 2 more had halted due to power fluctuations. This is reported in the "Chinese Captain Testifies Day 2" newsclip. NTSB officials say Davisson himself had been involved in three loss-of-power accidents in his 16 years as a river pilot. They say an average of one ship per day in the area suffers a loss of power similar to the one that caused the accident.
Language barriers and safety of "flag of convenience" vessels were batted around as issues as the 28 member crew remained on the ship.
Coast Guard says Sunday December 22 the Marine Safety Board will reconvene Jan. 6 to continue its probe into why the 70,000-ton Bright Field crashed on Dec. 14. The board already has completed its initial questioning of witnesses.
Late February 18, 1997 a fire broke out in the Bright Field as it was being repaired by Bolard Marine in Violet. Early reports were it was an accidental fire, perhaps caused by work being done or smoking workers.
The Riverwalk was built in 1986 at a cost of $58 million and had suffered a few ship minor ship impacts before, but none anywhere near as violent as this. The Bright Field hit the Riverwalk in the middle at the Cafe du Monde at 2:30 p.m. when a large crowd was on the Riverwalk. Several maps of the area are below.
116 people sustained injuries and no deaths have been reported. 15 shops and 456 hotel rooms were demolished. New Orleans Mayor Mark Morial is asking President Clinton to declare a disaster so the city can get federal aid to help repair damages.
Monday December 16th even as authorities tried to assess the damage, the first lawsuit against the ship's owners, the Cosco Co. of Hong Kong and Clearsky Shipping was filed Sunday in federal court in New Orleans. Walter Lejier, one of eight attorneys filing the suit, said the plaintiffs include several Riverwalk business owners, residents of One River Place condominiums who had to leave their homes because utility connections were severed, and the owner of a car that fell from a parking garage into the river.
COSCO and Clearsky Shipping are hoping maritime law will apply which limits liability to the value of the ship and its contents (about $16 million) if the ship is found seaworthy and the crew is void of negligence.
December 21 National Underwriter Property and Casualty Company began to discuss some of the insurance and property damage situations. The report is in the news reports below.
December 22 AP reported a contract diver aiding in cleanup efforts this weekend was trapped under water for about 15 minutes in the accident rubble, but officials say he was freed by other workmen and escaped injury.
Saturday December 21 the hearing learned of another "crash maneuver" switch. Also the engine cylinders or pistons had been repaired 9 times in the last 4 months due to an overheating exhaust temperature.This is reported the news clips below.
December 23 Reuters reported they have been off loading the 64,000 tons of corn at night to minimize the dust problems beginning Sunday night and may be able to move the ship Friday. Still unsure how much the mall wreckage is being supported by the ship under the Poydras Street Wharf. Early damage estimates of $250 million to businesses and another $250 million in losses.
December 24 the Times-Picayune reported wet corn was encountered and the off loading of the corn was ceased after only 400 tons had been removed.
December 30 the Times-Picayune reported the wreckage has become a "must see" city tourist site.
The major damages to the Bright Field were a 18 foot long tear three feet wide and a 30 foot long dent behind it. Both are about 12 feet below the waterline. After finding patching too difficult at this site, it was decided to unload more grain, and float the boat with gash above the water line and take it downriver with tugs to Violet for permanent repairs. When the Bright Field is removed from the rubble it will be immediately replaced with two barges to be used as a staging area for the demolition of the remaining debris.
January 6, 1997 the Bright Field is removed from the pier and moved 3 miles to Bollard Marine in Violet for repairs estimated to take 3 weeks.
January 6, 1997 hearings reveal the Bright Field had a near miss with a tug boat less than an hour before the crash near the Huey P. Long Bridge.
I think that as in most accidents, several thinks began to go wrong and they all added to put the ship in a bad set of operating conditions which caused the crash. I have been interested in the recent attempts to apply chaos theory and the ideas of complex adaptive systems to manufacturing and other business practices. It seems like this accident is a place they could also be applied. One of the concepts is that when things are going smoothly they may go that way for a long time, then a few subtle changes can cause major / drastic changes to the system. If you are already in a very dynamic position some minor events can send your system "to hell in a hand basket."
In this case the factors of allowing the hotel and shopping complex to be built "out over the water" in an area that has a history of many vessel impacts, the potential for language barriers with the Chinese crew and American pilot, allowing casino boats to dock in heavy traffic areas, the testing of cruise ship alarms at the pier "numbing" the mall employees to the sound of alarms, and perhaps insufficient training in the automatic engine over-ride system all contribute to make the operating conditions "shakey" to start with. When you combine this with a winding river channel, the speed of this huge vessel, and throw in a failed steering system and you are bound for trouble. It the contributing factors had been addressed the crew would have had much more time, been able to try the emergency over-ride, and if they did crash it would have been into a wharf or riverbank - not into a crowded shopping center.
First - Please talk to us. Tell us what you like and don't like about the site, plus any comments you have on the crash or investigation. E-mail us at email@example.com or give us a call at (800) 443-6543.
Second - You can always help us by increasing the awareness level of this site by mentioning it to you friends, others in the industry, and posting comments about it in newsgroups. Please use the opening page URL http://www.virtualpet.com/bright when passing the address along.
Third - Sometimes looking for specific things which we will list below. Any help would be greatly appreciated. Together we can make this a great site.
Has anybody out there seen a seismic record of the crash?? Know where we might find one? Please E-mail us at firstname.lastname@example.org or give us a call at (800) 443-6543.
Fourth - If you see anything else about the Bright Field or this crash you think should be posted on this page, please call it to our attention. You can be our "eyes and ears". Does anybody have a decent photo of her somewhere else or a better one of the tugs pushing on her?
Fifth - If you know any potential advertisers for this site, please call the site to their attention.
THANK YOU !!
If you have any comments on the Bright Field site, would like to see some specific information, or have any questions please E-mail us at email@example.com or give us a call at (800) 443-6543.
We will post clips from some of the comments here:
Date: Sun 22 Dec 1996
Just thought I'd make a small suggestion for your Bright Field/Riverwalk coverage.
The terms 'freighter' and 'freightliner' are incorrect terms for the Bright Field. These type vessels are correctly referred to as 'bulk carriers'. Yes I know all the media has used the term 'freighter', but it is still incorrect.
By the way, I recently retired from 25 years service in the US Merchant Marine as a Chief Engineer. So I am very interested in incidents such as Bright Field/Riverwalk. Thanks for your web coverage
Date: Tues 24 Dec 1996
Thanks for your reply. Of course, I had no trouble logging onto the
site today! It is a really fine job you've done.
Date: Christmas Wed 25 Dec 1996
A most excellent and informative site.
Thank you for providing this info!
Date: Wed 25 December 1996
First of all, your coverage is excellent and you have my thanks, as a retired mariner who likes to keep up with current maritime events.
Secondly, I finally got around to looking at the rest of your web site and like it very much. I've placed your site on my 'favorites' list.
Date: Friday 27 Dec 1996
Nice work on the Bright Field Info.... I happen to work at CG HQ ....The Investigations and Analysis Division which develops policy and procedures for such activities.
Date: Wednesday 1 January 1997
Well done web!!! Thanks for the info and a way of sorting out the scuttlebutt. I am a marine pilot in NY. Loss of the plant is not uncommon; rather a fact of life. The quality of seamanship, due to the policy of Foreign Flag crews, thus language difficulties is this incidents' smoking gun. You get what you pay for! My hats off to the River pilot for a job well done! State Pilots are our front line defense against this industries absurdities and profiteering with ill regards toward SAFETY.
Date: Thursday 2 January 1997
I am an active pilot at the panama canal and have piloted ships of all nationalities. I have noticed that PRC vessels have,as a general rule, very poor discipline. It frequently happens that the crew just wont respond to the Masters orders or respond on their own timetable. This has been explained to me to be the result of the crew and officers coming from different parts of China. (I have not noticed anything like this on HK or Taiwan vessels.) This may explain the anchor not being dropped promptly.
It is also my personal opinion that bridge control is not as dependable as having the engines on manual control from engine room. Also any pilot can tell you a suitcase full of horror stories of resulting from computer control of engine.
Date: Friday 3 January 1997
Great homepage on the Riverwalk/Brightfield accident! One recommendation for something else to add would be any information on where to contact if you were involved in the accident (unfortunately, I was eating at the LeMoynes Landing Restaurant when it hit and received a broken arm--I need to find out how I get my medical bills covered!!!)
Since I'm from out of state, your site had a TON of updated info--thanks!
Date: Saturday 4 January 1997
--- We were eating at the glass walled restaurant,on the river side,at the foot of the second set of escalators when the accident happened.we were watching the cruise ships loading and enjoying our meal when we began hearing this irritating horn sound.we watched the boat coming for about three minutes before it hit.truly a once in a lifetime experience.
Date: Wed, 08 Jan 1997
Yet another incident when a ships pilot saves the day. This occurs everyday throughout the world, yet governments continue to bow to the pressures of foreign ship owners, and misguided shippers whose only concern is the bottom line. Owners and their agents continually lobby to not take pilots, to improve the bottom line, without regard for life or property, for pilots are seen as a unnecessary cost. Capt. Davission is to be commended for his cool nerve and flawless judgment in the face of disaster, to have no loss of life was in such an accident is amazing This of course is part of the roll of the pilot. I'm sure Capt. Davisson felt that what he did was all in the course of his days work. Well done pilot!!!!
Date: Sun, 12 Jan 1997
The Bright Field is providing a great deal of excellent discussion for maritime law students and your web coverage is providing an extremely helpful service for the understanding of all the various factors involved in such an accident. As a student of maritime law I look forward to your upcoming survey of the legal issues involved with the Brightfield.
Date: Wed. 15 Jan 1997
A caller involved "from the client side" called to learn more about this Bright Field site and wondered where were located and how we got we became involved.
We are responding by creating a page to "toot our horn". We also established a link to it near the top of the page.
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1997
Subject: Lubricating Oil Pump
I have some questions and statements as to the specific cause of the accident, and the actions taken by the ship's engineers. What specific lubricating oil pump failed? From the website, I read one article that stated one engine had shutdown. If one engine did shutdown, then what happened to the other engine? Ship's with two engines usually have medium speed engines inwhich each engine has its own independent auxiliary systems. For example, both main engines would have two main lubricating oil pumps. One pump would be on-line and the other pump would be on standby (auto-start for low discharge pressure). If the on-line pump failed, the standby pump should come on-line and prevent the engine from shutting down by its safety shutdown pressure switch or minimize the restart-up period, if the ship's Engineers had the standby pump in automatic. I think it can be safely said that a cargo vessel built in 1988 would have the capability of auto-starting its auxiliary system pumps in case of on-line pump failure. I have participated in several USCG annual inspections, and one phase of the inspection includes the auto-starting auxiliary system pumps. Finally, what happened to the Chief Engineer and the Engineer on watch? What procedures did they take when the pump failed? The Captain may be the "Master" of the vessel but I believe the answers to what really happened, and how this accident can be prevented from occuring again, can be found from the Engineering personnel aboard the vessel.
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1997
If the M/V Bright Field had a tugboat escorting it, when she lost steering, it could have gave the ship a chance to avoid the crowded shopping center. If flag of convenience ships are not up to US safety standers, use escort tugs on them.
Date: Mon, 03 Feb 1997
Just Found your web-page regarding the New Orleans accident, which I found to be excellent in both design and content. However, as a recently retired Merchant Marine Captain of American Flag vessels with 25 years in the industry and 13 years in command, the point must be made that the accident had many positive aspects. The climate of the United States and the rest of the world no longer want well educated and trained mariners onboard ocean going vessels. Crew's wages are one of the few factors in vessel operation that a shipowner can control, and the cheaper the better. There remain only about 280 American flagged vessels. And not one of these vessels exist because anyone in government or business want them, they only survive under the benefit of existing laws. These laws give specific vessels the right to exist in specific applications, and these laws are now under fire. It is very likely that within the next few years that there will not be any American ships left at all. I didn't retire from going to sea because I wanted to. I retired because I didn't want to be the last guy to turn out the lights.
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 1997
By the way, where are you all based out of? You all have a killer web site on this boat accident!
reply - Stillwater Oklahoma USA
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 1997
Well good job on the site. My attornys very much so like the data and I like the lay-out.
Just a note, youy might want to add COSCOS manament structure and profiles, you can find this on the web. I think other attr. that access you site might like that data. Our office did!
reply - we immediately added the info requested
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 1997
Subject: BRIGHT FIELD Comment from a Belgian master
After two weeks of a desperate search to find anything on this incident, it was a wonder to find discover your website. (Thanks to Dejanews search) As master of Panamax bulkers for many years, I passed this area quite often, and I must say that I prefered to make a North Pacific crossing during the winter than to go up and down the Mississippi river to a grain silo.
My interest to the Bright Field accident is connected to a paper on ship's arrests and liabilities. A rough draft is already approved by the Belgian Shipmasters' Association and two International similar organizations. Therefater I hope it will reach the IMO level (International Maritime Organization) in London.
One of the main point of this paper is that the actual way of arresting vessels does not take into account their safe management. I was last years several months in this situation in Singapore and we had for some time no insurance cover while we had, among other, 1543 tons of various dangerous goods on board, including 414 tons of amonium nitrates. These can explode if ignited, as it happened in Texas City some decades ago.
But even an insurance cover is not always a guarantee that enough money will be available to cover the claims of a disaster. Had the Bright Field been a tanker, or hit a tanker at the same time, the damages done to the city of New Orleans could have been tremendous. The damages had reached an amount that the whole insurance system of the shipping industry could hardly pay. Arresting the vessel to pay for the claims would have covered only a small percentage of them. The same reasoning is also valid for many other coastal towns in the world.
Such a tragedy has the more chances to happen, that I am in a good position to confirm that the quality of the crew of large vessels is degrading every year, together with the reliability of the equipment. This was also evoked by one of your correspondant.
Another correspondant states that the Bright Field accident was more an engineer problem. But any responsible master has to assess the capacity of his engineers, and act accordingly. Not so long ago I protested against the intention of a crewing department to change a whole efficient engine team during a single call, just to replace them by cheaper unknown guys. Anyway with my next assignment I had to cope with an exotic chief engineer who proved to be quite incompetent . I sacked him after a few weeks, and his relieve was somewhat better. This confirms that it is not easy to find good marine engineers at sea nowadays. Without knowing much details, it is difficult to express a strong opinion on the capacities of the staff of the Bright Field. But as one correspondant wrote, the fact that the engine was controled from the bridge is already not a good point. Finally an engine breakdown is always the testimony that something is going badly wrong with the vessel maintenance. There is now a strong financial incentive to use cheap exotic crew, with the hope that the insurance will pay if something goes wrong.
There is now a strong financial incentive to use cheap exotic crew, with the hope that the insurance will pay if something goes wrong. That is why I am gathering material to show that the final payers will be the victims themselves, since there will be anyway very little money available to pay for the damage done. The only sound alternative is to fix that less accident happen by using experienced officers on deck and in the engine, and to care that the necessary equipment is properly supplied. If you are interested, I can provide some more articles on this subject of crew qualification, insurance and other today shipping problems.
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997
I am the Editor of a new (but growing) international magazine called ....
May I congratulate you on your Bright Field site. Apart from my business interest in the incident, I feel that I have a personal involvement as a regular visitor to N'awlins (I've been to the Workboat Show about seven times) and was in Riverwalk the week before the accident doing some Christmas shopping.
We wish to cover the story in our next issue (about one third of our 4000 circulation is in the US) and although we have received some amateur photos of the damage to both buildings and vessel we would really like a photo like the great shot you have of the ship being towed into midriver by about five tugs.
Did Dave Harvy Commmercial Photography take any around the 6th January? I know from other press credits that he took some earlier but I cannot locate his phone/fax number.
If you are able to help in anyway at all, not only would I be extremely grateful but would mention your web site in our article so our readers could find out more.
reply - We found and contacted David Harvey and relayed his contact information to this gentleman as well as posted in on the web site in the Photos area and on the evidence page.
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997
a job well done on creating and maintaining a web page on this incident. i'm glad to see the internet spotlight shine on it. i am an active state licensed harbor pilot in florida and can appreciate what the river pilot went through. i've handled upwards of three thousand vessels, virtually all of them foreign flag and a number of them PRC flagged vessels in particular. talk about a language barrier!
state pilots nationwide are becoming acutely aware of the need for 'bridge team management' (or bridge resource management). it is loosely based on what airline pilots are trained in - cockpit resource management.
the licensed individuals on the bridge of a ship can be looked at as a team of navigators, not just a pilot, a captain ( if even on the bridge), a third mate .
anyway, i appreciate your efforts. please contact me if i can be of any assistance.
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997
I personaly know Mr. Davisson. He is one of the best pilots I have ever been associated with. He should be commended for his excellent job in avoided a major catstrophe. I am currently employed on a riverboat casino. This is just another example justifing the rule requiring riverboat casinos to cruise. When the so called riverboat casinos become dockside. The casino companies opt for barges instead of Coast Guard inspected and certified vessels, resulting in substandard fire and safety requirements. If you compared the two vessels the Bright Field and the casino vessel, who provides more jobs or tax dollars for the state of Louisiana certainly not the Bright Field. Don't do away with riverboat cruising do away with unsafe vessels crewed by undertrained foreign crews.
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997
Subject: BRIGHTFIELDS ISM
You have done an excellent job with this site. As a maritime educator I have discovered an ISM segue without peer. I found the legal links especially useful. I also am impressed with chart showing allsions in area since 1983.
Does anyone know if BRIGHTFIELDS had been issued a SMC/ISM? Had COSCO been issued document of compliance under ISM? Had the ISM Certification Process been begun by vessel or operator? If so, what bearing will it have in court.
Thanks for your help. Great site.
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 1997 01:06:32 -0700
your webpage on the new orleans tanker accident is incredible. have you done any other websites on other accidents as comprehensive as this one?
i'd love to see more. i'm producing a television show all about domestic and international disasters and webpages like www.virtualpet.com/bright/bright.htm would be extremely useful to me.
i look forward to hearing from you soon.
Date 22 Apr 1997
Phone call Log
RBBI was contacted by a representative of a U.S. Navy Lab interested in the Bright Field web site. They would like to use it as part of briefing promoting the use of "agents" to control ships. This is part of the complex-adaptive systems work (chaos theory) that seems to be filtering into may fields now. I told them they could use anything they wanted, but to be alert of the copyright restrictions on the materials we had posted from other sources.
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 1997 02:01:02 -0700
Subject: Bright Field Site Input and Comments
Hello, I am a midshipman at the University of San Diego Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. Thank you for the information located at the Bright Field web page. I am conducting a report on the incident and have found almost everything I need to complete it at your web site. There are two things that I would like to find further information on. The first, a letter was written on January 31, 1997 concerning the lube oil pump and auxilary back ups. A posted response would be most helpful at its location. Second, is there any NTSB reports or findings yet and if there are could you please post them or direct me to reports. Once again thank you for your oustanding report and presentation of the incident.
Date: Tue, 29 Apr 1997 16:07:28 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: bright field;limitation of liability
Thanks for the wonderful site. I am a law student in New Orleans and am preparing to write a law review article on the continuing validity of the Limitation of Liability Act in the wake of the Bright Field disaster. If you can think of any information that might be helpful, please E-Mail me a cite list. Also, if you could please provide a list of sources to obtain transcripts of the NTSb &/or Coast Guard hearings. Thanks
Dates: Dec 22 to Dec 29 1997 Subject: Bright Field SpeedWe received 3 letters from an individual concerned about the speed of the Bright Field. We used those letters as a basis for our Bright Field Accident Speed Issue Page.