Bright Field
Background & Reference Materials
This page is for those investigating the crash, law students, and others interested in pursing the details of the crash. More general coverage is available on the Bright Field Riverwalk Accident Page. Here we will be discussing some additional background and reference materials that investigators may find useful.

We will be listing reference materials here for those involved with the actual hearings and proceedings as well as others interested in gaining a greater understanding of the crash. If anybody sees anything else that should be listed here, please drop us an E-mail at polsong@virtualpet.com or give us a call at (800) 443-6543.

The link on the reference items will lead you to a brief abstract or a few comments about it. We open with a listing of some magazines that appear frequently in the references.

Marine Technology
The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME)
601 Pavonia Avenue
Jersey City NJ 07306
(800) 798-2188
(201) 798-4800



Marine Log
1809 Capitol Avenue
Omaha NE 68102
(800) 895--4389
(402) 346-4740

Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council
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If you have trouble finding any of the references, most of them are available from CARL.

Official Reports of the Accident

Chaos

It was certainly a complex system in operation at the time of the crash.

U.S. Coast Guard Publications

FOC - Flag of Convenience

Classification System

Anchors

Law of Tug Tow and Pilotage

Maneuverability of Ships

Other NTSB Investigations

Engines

Riverboat Gambling

Large Ship Crash Worthiness

News Reports of Crash (Bright Field Website)

Websites of Organizations and Companies Involved in Crash

"The Secret of Life at the Limits: Cogs Become Big Wheels"

 Smithsonian. July 1989. pages 38-49.

Researchers are learning how complex organizations like aircraft carriers and electric utilities perform so well when everything has to go right. These two examples are high-reliability, complex organizations which in the face of fast-changing situations manage to achieve remarkably low failure rates. The chain of command is evident, but when the going gets tough all work together on equal footing. When the heat is really turned up , cogs can become big wheels (the articles title). Whatever their status in the formal hierarchy they are trained extensively every day that - based on their own expertise - they can take complete command, redirect operations or bring them to a complete hault. The article focuses primarily on the activities on an aircraft carrier deck, all the communications associated with safe operation, and the resulting feeling of being a team. It is a great article and I have referred many people to it over the last few years.

"Alliances, human factors and flags"

 Marine Log. June 1996. Pages 19-30.

For most shipowners, the big issues center on the role of global alliances and the impact of tougher regulations rather than on flags. The issue that overrides all others is always earnings. The second most important issue is usually the impact of regulations. The particular flag a ship flies is only of interest to the extent that it maximizes the first and minimizes the second.

Statistics of the top shipping registers used by U.S. based owners are given as well as the number of ships, their total GRT and DWT and Horsepower for the top 25 U.S. based shipowners. The number, size, and type of the ships belonging to U.S. based owners and similar stats for the entire world fleet are given along with the average age of the ships. The top 20 ship registers in Gross Tonnage are also listed along with the average age of ships in their registry.

"Maneuvering Information for the Pilot/Navigator: Its Source, Value, and Limitations"

. Marine Technology. Vol. 31 No. 2 April 1994. Pages 123-144. By Thomas G. Knierim.

In 1987 a ship struck a bridge in the Brunswick River in Georgia. The NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) investigation after the accident determined that the ship's pilot had not studied the ship's maneuvering information, but if he had, would not have understood the terms "advance" and "transfer." He also did not appreciate the effects of trim or bottom clearance on a ship's maneuverability. By inference NTSB suggested this ignorance of terms and hydraulic effects may be widespread, and apply to a large percentage of pilots. Also, the courts have determined that a vessel may be considered unseaworthy and a navigator/pilot possibly liable should he not understand and use all navigation aids (ARPA, charts, maneuvering information, etc.). This paper attempts to explain the many different forms of maneuvering information developed by naval architects, how they are derived, and the strengths and weaknesses of the information exhibited on the bridge. ... There is also discussion of the efforts of Japanese pilots to rate and keep records of actual ship maneuverability. The hope is that through knowledge will come safer and more economical pilotage.

Page 124 presents a non dimensional "Tactical Diameter" and using it classifies ships into 5 ratings of maneuverability. In the Sidney Lanier Bridge hit (the case discussed in the paper) the pilot made a turn as he was leaving a near perpendicular side channel to join the main river channel and was unable to recover and get back in the middle of the river before hitting a bridge downstream. This particular ship had very poor performance in turns. Had the pilot understood the ship's limited maneuvering / turning capabilities, with his knowledge of the river he would have used other methods to make the turn.

Pages 129 and 130 cover Slowing and stopping which is a major element of the Bright Field crash. The crash stop maneuver from full ahead to full astern is a standard shipbuilder's test for trying out new ship machinery. It provides an index to relative stopping ability. From a navigators standpoint the same test ran from more typical maneuvering speeds would be more useful. The ship's own resistance at higher initial speed will dissipate a substantial amount of kinetic energy at the beginning of the maneuver. The resistance falls off rapidly, however as speed decreases. The other factor is the backing thrust provided by the ship's propeller. This thrust is not produced very efficiently, since the propeller blades are shaped for ahead efficiency; additionally, steam turbine ships have a limited astern power and some diesel ships require reduced ship speed before putting on astern rpm. In any event at slow ship speeds, propulsion is the predominant stopping force. ... In open seas the turning of a tight circle is the fastest way to dissipate speed. In more limited waters sometimes the ship can be rudder steered from side to side to break off some speed. ... At high speeds ahead the ship propellers have more stopping ability at dead slow ahead (props turn forward real slow) than full astern, where they are liable to draw in air (ventilate) or be unable to get a good bite. With the ships engines at full astern the navigator has lost much or most of his ability to steer.

Pages 130-132 discuss the special maneuvering considerations of shallow waters (like the river channel). The ships turning circle increases, the ship's directional stability changes in an unpredictable way, and the ship's draft amidship increases and trim changes. The ship wants to "squat" and as it gets near a bank a suction tries to pull it closer and prevent breaking away from the bank.

Pages 138-139 discuss the system the Japanese pilots are using to accumulate ongoing observations of the ship's maneuverability from many pilots as the ship is used in normal operations. This data has resulted in warnings being issued to their pilots to be especially cautious of specific ships and some proposed maneuvering standards.

Pages 140-143 are glossary of maneuvering terminology

"Prediction of Craft Turning Characteristics"

. Marine Technology. Vol. 28 No. 1 January 1991. Pages 1-13. By Stephen B. Denny and Nadine Hubbie.

A procedure is presented for predicting steady turning radius and turning rate of planing and displacement craft equipped with conventional propeller and rudder arrangements. The procedure enables prediction of turning characteristics for various rudder angles and approach speeds. Predictions of steady turning radii are compared with actual trial data for craft up to 110 ft in length. General graphs are presented which can be used by designers and craft operators to estimate approximate steady turning radius and turn rate when a minimum of craft information is available.

"Ship Maneuverability Analysis Using Steady-State Techniques"

. Marine technology. Vol. 28 No. 3. May 1991. Pages 163-180. By Volf Asinovsky, Kiang-Ning Huang, and Mark C. Oakes.

This paper discusses the application of steady-state techniques of maneuverability,position-keeping and track-keeping analyses in the ship design process. A two-step method of calculating the diagram of steering is described.

"Several Recent Rammings Investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board"

. Marine Technology. Vol. 28 No. 6. November 1991. Pages 303-313. by Ralph E. Johnson and Leon Z. Katcharian.

This paper discusses several recent rammings investigated by the NTSB:(1) the ramming of the U.S. fishing vessel Chickadee by the guided-missile frigate USS Richard L. Page (FFG-5), (2) the ramming of the Sidney Lanier Bridge by the Polish bulk carrier Ziemia Bialostocka, (3) the ramming of the Spanish bulk carrier Urduliz by the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN69), and (4) the ramming of the French tankership Camargue by the Swedish auto carrier Figaro.

The paper begins with a discussion of the National Transportation Safety Board, its history, its responsibilities, and its general method of operations. Several graphics show some of the ways data can be presented for better visual understandings of what occurred, especially locations, relative positions, and event time lines.

"The Grounding of Exxon Valdez: An Examination of the Human and Organizational Factors"

. Marine Technology. Vol. 31. NO. 1. January 1994. Pages 41-51. By William H. Moore.

Just after midnight on March 24, 1989 the tankership Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince Williams Sound, Alaska. The consequences of the accident were the loss of 258,000 barrels of crude oil resulting in substantial environmental and economic loss. The vessel possessed the best technologies available to the tanker industry and was the pride of the Exxon fleet. However, the complexity and the potential catastrophic consequences of using these new technologies is leading to the examination of a more critical element: the human factor. it has been determined that approximately 65% of catastrophic marine-related accidents have been the result of compounded human and organizational errors (HOE) during operations. Consequently, tanker operators and regulatory agencies have begun to realize the importance of examining the critical human factor element in tankship operations. Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) procedures using influence diagraming are currently being developed to examine the effects of HOE in marine-related accidents. This paper examines (1) the human and organizations elements which led to the grounding of Exxon Valdez, (2) structuring the accident cause-effect relationships into an analytical framework, (3) methods for probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of HOE in the accident, (4) changes in operational and regulatory policy in post-Exxon Valdez era, and (5) methods for determining HOE management alternatives for future tanker operations.

The paper develops some excellent methods for mapping the influence of events and decisions upon the grounding of the Exxon Valdez. This same procedure could be used quite nicely on the Bright Field crash.

"Reliability Analysis of Great Lakes Marine Diesels: State of the Art and Current Modeling"

. Marine Technology. Vol. 27 No. 4. July 1990. Pages 237-249. By Anastassios N. Perakis and Bahadir Inozu.

Some essential steps for the application of reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) techniques to marine diesel engines are presented. The paper begins with a summary of the basic concepts of reliability engineering , followed by a survey of the relevant literature on RAM applications to the marine industry and to marine diesel engines in particular. Next, the results of an informal survey of the reliability, maintenance, and replacement practices of Great Lakes operators are presented. Finally, the first two steps for a RAM application, failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis, are introduced and applied for a prototype Colt-Piestick marine diesel engine.

Page 240 gives the failure rate for certain components. When the diesel engine is modeled, the lubricating oil system (LOS) is discussed on pages 241 and 242. It describes each engine as having two systems. One driven by the engine itself, and a backup driven by a motor.

"Bulk Carrier Safety"

. Marine Technology. Vol. 33 No. 4. Oct 1996. Pages 309-318. By Karen Frystock and Jack Spencer.

During the past ten years, more than 700 crewmen have died as a result of Bulk Carrier casualties. The majority of the vessels are over 15 years old. Inadequate maintenance and improper loading have been likely contributing factors. Carrier designs have not matched expectations as these vessels age.

The article focuses on structural damages from bow impacts and slamming. Page 316 has a nice table listing the various families of ships, their length, DWT, and general hull configurations.

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